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General economic forces acting upon structural change in 
agriculture dominate the impacts of changes in agricultural policy. 
Particular factors are: (1) High demand for land for non-
agricultural purposes. (2) High demand for residences in rural 
areas. (3) Demand for leisure space. (4) Changing occupational 
expectations and a move away from physical labour. 
Structural adjustment in agriculture is a steady process, driven 
by the enlargement of commercial farms and by the 
marginalisation of large numbers of smaller farms whose 
managers increasingly rely on off farm income and part-time 
operation. The most heavily commercial sector is becoming less 
dependent upon traditional support and more heavily influenced by 
the integrated contracts with downstream processors. The rate and 
direction of farm structure adjustment in the EU is unlikely to 
change as a consequence of any likely reforms in agricultural 
policy.  
The separation of EU farming into commercial and 
lifestyle/part-time operations lends itself to a two-track policy, with 
conservation and amenity output policy concentrated on the latter. 
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There is a fairly conventional list of drivers of agricultural adjustment. On the one 
hand there are the drivers of agricultural policy reform, which are usually presented as 
WTO negotiations, environmental and amenity concerns, budgetary constraints and, in 
the case of the EU, integrating the new member states into the CAP. On the other hand 
are the general economic and social drivers of change. This raises the intriguing questions 
of what impact agricultural policy change has on the different sub-structures of the 
farming sector, and what is the dynamic path of any adjustment. Does, and will further, 
policy change in the European Union have much impact o agricultural production and the 
food chain in the EU15
2? 
 
The reason the above questions need to be posed, is because in the crowded 
northern and western countries of the EU general pressures of economic growth and 
concentration of the downstream supply chain may now be the dominating factors driving 
agricultural adjustment. Economic growth is driving demand for more roads, housing and 
country living and forcing up land prices and the opportunity costs of farming. It is 
enabling well-paid professionals to buy country properties, which would formerly have 
been classed as farms in a proper sense, but, which despite some continuity of form, no 
longer deserve to be classed as such. Meanwhile, the concentration at the top of the food 
chain is forcing commercial farming to increase its scale of operation and integrate into 
contract chains for just in time delivery. To what extent are commercial farms influenced 
by the transfer payments of the new agricultural and rural policy, as opposed to new 
regulatory systems? Also to what extent are the lifestyle holdings of wealthy individuals, 
which account for increasing areas of land, influenced by policy? 
 
 
Pressures for further policy reform. 
 
 
In broad outline the relative influence of the factors shaping policy reform in the 
EU, beyond those in the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the Agenda 2000 changes to the 
CAP, seem fairly clear. Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler has frequently 
reiterated the EU’s basic position in the WTO negotiations. The EU has offered to accept 
a repeat of the 36% average tariff cut in the Uruguay Round, and to cut amber and blue 
box ceiling expenditures by 60%. The latter should be satisfied by the 2003 Mid-Term 
Review (MTR) outcome, whereby the single farm payment transferred most of the blue 
box support to the green box; thus, this should not entail any additional constraint on 
policy. The EU has stated preparedness to increase the proposed cut in export subsidies 
generally to 45%, provided parallel treatment is applied to US export credits, but to phase 
them out for products of particular interest to developing countries (Agra Europe April 
  22004). At this stage agreement on export credits has not been concluded, and only 
removing export subsidies of importance to developing countries is on offer currently; 
something which will require major reform of the EU sugar regime.  
 
The room for further manouevre by the EU before 2014 is heavily constrained by 
the enlargement process, and the extreme complexities of administering the MTR policy 
measures already agreed after much hard bargaining. The policy decision to consolidate 
all direct agricultural subsidies into a single farm payment was agreed in June 2003, with 
considerable room for subsidiarity in its application to enable the decision to be ratified. 
Thus the EU is bound to staunchly defend the position that its expenditure on the single 
farm payment is decoupled, not trade-distorting and that it in can be defined as lying in 
the green box. The new scheme has to be implemented in 2007 at the latest, but some 
countries (such as the UK and Ireland) will do so in 2005. The UK will adopt a fully 
decoupled system from the outset, and in that sense the payment will be independent of 
production, but the right to payment will only be transferable between agricultural 
producers. Other countries, such as France, will take full advantage of the scope within 
the scheme for partial coupling of payments; thus 25% of the arable element of any farms 
single payment will be linked to production, 50% of any ewe premium element within the 
payment, and 100% of the beef cow suckler premium, etc…   
 
Given the rigid budgetary ceiling on EU agricultural policy costs, the further 
switch of policy to direct payments, coupled with the costs of enlargement, may well 
force some further policy adjustments before 2014. The precise nature of these is difficult 
to foresee, but options include further cuts in intervention and storage aids, and reductions 
in the direct payments after 2008. 
 
In the UK the scope for subsidiarity has, in the case of the dairy premium element 
of the single payment, been taken to the point where the devolved national governments 
have decided on different principles of implementation. Wales and Scotland have both 
decided that dairy farmers registered in March 2005, should receive the full premium 
compensation for reduction in dairy product price supports based on production in 2000-
2002. England has decided only to assign milk producers 90% of the premium in 2005, 
transferring the remaining 10% into the pot to be assigned on an area basis to all 
producers; and it has decided to switch a further 10% per year into the general pot until 
all the premium is allocated on an area basis by 2012, with every producer receiving the 
same regional payment per hectare irrespective of past or present production. Northern 
Ireland has adopted a different “static hybrid” model in comparison to England’s dynamic 
hybrid. To add complexity the single payment itself will be subject to a modulation tax 
whereby a portion of the payment will be transferred to finance environmental and rural 
development schemes. Furthermore, the modulation tax itself will be subject to an 
element of national discretion. 
 
The UK single payment scheme is excessively complicated when taken as whole. 
When that consideration is extended to the other member states, and takes into account 
the enlargement agreement issues, it is difficult to see that the EU has much room to 
radically change policy (beyond that agreed in the MTR) before 2015, except in the area 
of export subsidies.  
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Setting domestic EU factors aside, it is not obvious that there is great external 
pressure through WTO for reform beyond the limiting markers set by the European 
Commission. The pressure from the USA seems greatly muted compared to that in the 
Uruguay Round, although moderately bellicose remarks are uttered from time to time. 
The 2002 Farm Bill has stripped the USA of some of its moral authority on trade 
liberalisation, and given EU lobbies resisting agricultural reform an easier ride. 
Furthermore, the Cairns Group seems less strident in its attacks on the CAP. This overall 
assessment of the relative weakness of external pressure derives some support from 
Josling (2004). Josling highlights key issues which will have to be resolved between 
developing and developed countries before progress can now be made. The sort of 
institutionalised decoupling of support being undertaken by the EU, he sees as necessary 
to move the CAP reform agenda forward, despite the economic reality being that in 
practice the single payment will not be incentive neutral
3. The USA and EU can no longer 
manage the WTO agenda to suit themselves, but Josling argues that the developing 
countries have to accept that policies which are acceptable to developed countries “are 
not necessarily incompatible with open markets. To make reductions in absolute spending 
a condition for allowing more market access is risking throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater”. Thus, at the moment the WTO process appears stalled, and there are obstacles 
to circumvent before it is back on track. 
 
In the EU, environmental politics plays a large role, and chimes in well with the 
process of transferring agricultural support from price and market supports to direct 
payments. The transparency of direct payments facilitates the process of re-targeting 
those payments towards the production of public conservation, amenity and landscape 
goods, and the withdrawal of support for output surplus to market requirements. Thus 
there is the process of progressive modulation (increasing tax of direct payments, with 
their transfer to rural and environmental payments), and it explains why England opted 
for a scheme (detailed above) whereby the dairy premium will diffuse into a flat area 
payment by 2012. The legitimacy of the future CAP is going to depend upon political 
acceptance that it is a green policy. 
 
 
The Diminishing Impact of Market and Price Support Policies. 
 
 
It is conventional wisdom that the long-run elasticity of aggregate agricultural 
supply response to output and input prices is relatively low (Chibber (1984), Mohan Rao 
(1989), Binswanger (1989)). The methodology of determining that is complex, and the 
results not wholly compelling, but the question for current purposes is not with 
methodology, but rather whether the importance of policy prices may not be declining, 
and the relative importance of other drivers might be increasing. 
 
All of the references just cited argue that non-price factors are more important in 
the long-term dynamic than prices. In particular it is technological change, and 
Cochrane’s treadmill of innovation which enables/causes agriculture to adapt to declining 
real margins to land by increasing the productivity of labour, non-land capital and 
  4intermediate inputs. This process causes relative declines in output prices, but is sufficient 
to enable supply to increase in quantity terms. Crucially underlying this dynamic is major 
structural change, driven by the enlargement of commercial farms in area and capital size 
and by the marginalisation of large numbers of smaller farms whose managers 
increasingly rely on off farm income and part-time operation.  
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This process of structural change is particularly well documented for the USA, but 
is mirrored (without the same statistical richness) in Europe, as elsewhere. The USDA 
  5uses the very interesting full classification of farms presented in Table 1. In what it calls 
its “collapsed” classification even the “Farming Occupation Households with High Sales” 
are not included in the Commercial Family Farm category. Taking that definition only the 
bottom three categories in Table 1 are commercial; in 2001 these collectively account for 
only 9.5% of farm holdings, farming 41.5% of the land, and producing 71.9% of the value 
of production. The 1,286,549 farming households in the limited resource, retirement and 
residential lifestyle categories (classed collectively as rural residence farming households) 
accounted in 2001 for 59.9% of holdings, 20.2% of farmed land, and only 6.4% of the 
value of output. 
 
Strikingly all three of the rural residence farming households on average made a 
negative return on their farming operations in 2001, as did the “farming occupation with 
low sales households”. While comparable data are not available for the EU, or even 
individual member states, there is every reason to believe that in some respects the 
position is not dissimilar. The process of concentration is taking place everywhere, and 
many of the smallest holdings are part-time farms relying on off-farm income. Farming 
losses are common, even among full-time farmers, when family labour time is costed at 
hired labour rates. A recent study of UK dairy farmers estimates that in 2002/3 60% of 
England and Wales dairy farmers made a net income loss from milk production, and that 
40% of milk was produced at a loss (Colman et al., 2004a). Comparable figures for the 
USA, indicate around 30% of milk producers making losses (McElroy et al. 2002, p.39) 
 
From the standpoint of supply response, this increasing concentration in the 
structure of production probably means a reduction in the importance of price support 
policies, and therefore a decline in the importance of policy reform itself. (Although farm 
lobbies will fight hard to hold onto existing subsidies). The commercial farms, which 
dominate production, have moved away from simple commodity production and 
increasingly have to be linked into the supply chain to ensure markets for the relatively 
large volumes they produce. Intervention buying and undifferentiated bulk commodity 
sold spot, is decreasingly seen as basis for longer-term commercial survival. Contract 
prices rather than policy support prices are increasingly the crucial consideration, and 
these can differ appreciably, as exemplified in the UK dairy sector. Nevertheless the 
direct subsidy payments are important, and despite being formally fully or partially 
decoupled, will provide funds which can be used to maintain a positive cash flow and 
investment funds for the farming enterprise. However, with price intervention policies cut 
back and the switch to decoupled direct payments, the impact agricultural policies on 
aggregate supply in the EU15 will be greatly reduced. In addition structural change in 
farming is, it is argued, reducing the sensitivity of supply to changes in such agricultural 
support policies as exist. 
 
Another factor reducing sensitivity to price policy, as suggested by Howarth 
(1990), relates to the internal structure of commercial farming units in Europe. He 
observed that the decline in the number of holdings in the UK was relatively slow and 
steady, and that a much larger reduction had taken place in the number of hired worker. 
This reduction in reliance on hired labour, he sees as reducing the sensitivity of farmers to 
price uncertainty and change. Of course many of the remaining holdings, as in the USA, 
became part-time, hobby, and retirement operations, thus reducing their dependence on 
  6policy support, while the commercial sector has reduced to a much leaner harder core of 
committed farmers. Again this can be readily exemplified by the UK dairy industry.  
 
If, as is universally recognised (e.g. Josling and Hamway 1972, Cochrane and 
Runge 1992 (p.19)) the larger commercial farmers receive most of the support payments, 
and if commercial agriculture is increasingly concentrated on a declining number of 
holdings, what basis can there be for suggesting that the influence of  agricultural support 
policy on supply may be declining? One reason for suggesting that is that, although in the 
USA and EU real farm support has been static or declining for some years, supply has 
continued to increase in volume for a majority of commodities, and the process of 
structural adjustment has continued unabated, as indeed it must in response to declining 
real product prices. The large commercial farms are developing for the long-run, and 
when particular owners cease production others take their place. Large commercial farms 
adapt to meet the challenge of declining output to input price ratios, irrespective of 
whether those declines are caused by policy reform or by basic market forces. 
 
Secondly many of the largest commercial farms, in the USA at least, are not 
heavily dependent on direct support payments. (In Europe, where the switch to direct 
payments from price support is occurring later, direct support is set to play a larger role in 
net farm incomes in the next 10 years or so). However, the picture which is revealed for 
the USA is in all probability applicable to the EU15 as well. There, as reported in 
McElroy et al. (2002, p.27), 54% government payment in 2001 was for cash grain and 
oilseeds, with a further 24% for other crops. Thus relatively little support was for dairy, 
pigs and other sectors. Consequently many of the largest commercial farms were not 
heavily dependent upon government transfers. According to the Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey results reported by McElroy et al., only six percent of the gross 
income of reporting commercial farms was accounted for by direct payments, as 
compared to 11% for intermediate family farms, and 15% for rural residence farms. 
Given that these three classes of farms account for 41.5, 38.2 and 6.4% of production 
respectively, it is clear that in the USA the dominant commercial sector is less reliant on 
policy payment transfers, although there are still indirect supports from import restrictions 
and export credits. True the average direct transfer to those commercial farms receiving 
payments is much larger than to those intermediate and residential farms receiving 
payments, because the commodity related payments are based on past production levels.  
 
Even more significant is the difference within the commercial category between 
very large family farms and non-family commercial farms. The latter, 55,440 in number, 
contributed 13.6% of the total value of production, but received on average only around 
$16,000 per farm, whereas the very large reporting family farms received over $90,000 
(McElroy et al p.28). Clearly this disparity reflects the overall difference in commodity 
orientation of the two key commercial groups, with the very large family farms heavily 
engaged in crop production and the non-family farms in less-heavily subsidised products. 
 
From the above casual analysis of the USA situation, it seems reasonable to argue 
that the most heavily commercial sector is less dependent upon traditional support 
policies than the residential and smaller family farm sectors, and will be lees susceptible 
to future changes in those policies. 
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Data is not so readily available for the EU to support the argument developed 
above, but there are sufficient straws in the wind to sustain it. Using UK data, it is 
apparent that the bottom line of the agriculture sector account is more heavily dependent 
upon direct support than in the USA. In 2001 (TSO 2002), total subsidies to agriculture 
were provisionally recorded at £1.943 billion, which was a 14.7% supplement to gross 
output at market prices and 49.6% of net value added. With the further switch of some 
market support to direct payment as consequence of the MTR, those percentages are set 
to rise. Because all the payments will be wrapped up into a single farm payment from 
2007 at the latest, 2005 in the case of the UK and Ireland, there is an immediate question 
of the impact of this reform on outputs. If the payment is viewed by farmers as decoupled, 
from the standpoint of incentive to produce, this reform represents a significant cut in 
support. Divergent views exist about the supply response impact of this. In part the 
divergence hinges on the question of whether farmers will in fact treat the payment as 
decoupled, or will continue with business as usual using the single payment to subsidise 
continuance of their basic farming business. There are those who have argued the latter is 
probable (e.g. Colman and Harvey 2004b). That view is based on the evidence that many 
producers are in effect making losses, by accepting rewards to labour and capital that are 
lower than any plausible assessments of their opportunity costs. However those producers 
are very slow to respond to economic stimuli, and are resistant to change, so that any 
supply response by them slowly manifests itself in the longer run. 
 
There are however others who are more acutely concerned about opportunity 
costs, and will (and are) responding to the reduction of coupled support by stopping dairy 
farming (as an example) and some are ceasing production early. However, there is no sign 
as yet that others are not prepared to take their place, either as dairy farmers or producers 
of other products. The demand for agricultural land remains steady in most parts of 
Europe, reflecting the intention of many farmers to expand their operation as 
opportunities arise. 
 
The Influence of Economic Growth. 
 
 
The general economic forces acting upon structural change in agriculture in Western 
Europe are very powerful, and may well dominate the impacts of changes in agricultural 
policy. Particular factors are: 
1.  High demand for land for non-agricultural purposes. 
2.  High demand for residences in rural areas, in the UK certainly, and elsewhere. 
3.  Demand for leisure space (e.g. golf courses, or keeping horses). 
4.  Changing occupational expectations and a move away from physical labour. 
 
In other words the opportunity costs of farming have steadily risen as the rewards (on 
an area basis certainly) have been diminishing. At the same time, urban pressures and 
general income growth have created additional competition for the land resource. 
 
Demand for land. As regards land prices, there are two counter-forces at work. On 
the one hand low farm incomes are holding down the price of that land with no 
  8alternatives outside agriculture, and in particular land of low grazing quality. On the other 
hand, the value of properties on the land rise as residential house price inflation (in the 
UK) runs ahead of general inflation, imparting very high values to land with building 
permission. There is a very steady annual loss of agricultural land for residential 
building
3. In addition there is some loss to roads and commercial development. The tight 
controls on change of land use ensure that planning values remain high, especially given 
the “roll-over” tax provision which removes capital gains tax on land sale profits 
provided the money is re-invested in agricultural land.  
 
In the UK these two counter-forces have tended to cancel each other out over time. 
This is shown in Figure 1 by the graph of real land prices
4 from 1973 (when the UK first 
joined the European Union) and 2001, the latest figures available. The real price in 2001 
is 6.5% below its 1973 starting point on these calculations, but, very significantly, has 
risen sharply from a low point of 59.3% in 1993 during what has been a sustained period 
of general economic growth and substantial net farm income decline. Over the period 
1900 to 2002 the agricultural area in the UK has shrunk by over 0.3% per year and 3.7% 
in total. That process will continue, and the latest issue of Farmland Market (2004) 
confirms higher land prices throughout the UK, with demand strong from residential 
buyers.  
 




























It is worth noting that agricultural land prices in the UK are certainly not the highest 
in the EU15. According to data produced by Farmland Market (2003, p.19), they are 
below those of the Netherlands, the former Western parts of Germany, Belgium, Spain, 
Italy and Greece. All of these have high population densities, in which pressure for 
housing, work, and living space place a high opportunity costs on land for agricultural 
  9purposes in many locations. The market response to this pressure leads to the aspects of 
structural change noted above: 
1.  More land is taken over by residential and retirement owners. The former are 
essentially non-commercial and supported by non-farming income and wealth, 
and the latter have no intention of moving and are prepared to consume their 
assets. 
2.  The commercial sector declines in area, and concentrates into larger, more-
intensive units. The product mix moves away from cereal and oilseed production 
(which can be handled by contract field operators, with little input by owners) to 
higher valued more intensive forms of livestock production and specialist crops. 
This may be associated by either a decrease or increase in total agricultural output 
by volume. 
3.  Increased farming specialisation entails fewer farming enterprises per holding. 
4.  On farm diversification occurs, with movement into downstream marketing and/or 
processing and non-agricultural enterprises. 
5.  More owner-farmers become part-time and take off-farm work, and the amount of 
permanent hired labour is reduced. 
 
Changing attitudes to farming.  Another driver of structural change is the fact that 
fewer and fewer sons and daughters of farming families are attracted to take up farming. 
The expansion of higher education, and the lowly status of agriculture as a university 
subject, has seen increasing numbers of farmers offspring attracted to finance, bio-
science, and the professions. The attraction of non-manual professional employment with 
high regular salaries and holidays diminishes the supply of willing recruits of high 
academic quality into farming. In itself that is a reflection of economic growth and 
increases in opportunities. For high-flyers to wish to enter agriculture as a full-time 
occupation requires farming jobs to provide working conditions increasingly similar to 
those for middle management in other sectors. There has to be the opportunity for 
holidays, and remuneration (when adjusted for the values of independence and job-
satisfaction) to lead a middle-class lifestyle and educational opportunities for children. It 
is through increasing enterprise scale, specialisation, and allowing management to 
withdraw from manual labour which creates conditions to realise these expectations and 
conditions. 
 
A Possible Way Forward. 
 
 
Given the structural changes occurring in farm ownership and operating structures 
in the EU15, a logical policy strategy would be to focus the conservation and amenity 
elements of environmental policy on lifestyle and retirement farms, and to allow 
commercial agriculture to evolve subject to a minimal safety net and necessary pollution 
controls.  
 
At present there is a lack of clarity about the amount of amenity and landscape 
output from agriculture that society wants. At times there appears to be a presumption 
that all farmland should produce some positive public goods. This view is exemplified by 
the current position in England, and in the new pilot “broad and shallow” scheme to be 
  10initiated in 2005 as an “Entry Level Agri-Environment Scheme”. Farms within the pilot 
areas will become eligible for small area payments if they score a more than a minimum 
number of points for certain practices, features and outputs. There is clearly an 
expectation that this may be rolled out across the country, and it appears that some 
organisations envisage this a step towards a situation where all farms will have to commit 
to producing positive conservational outputs to receive any public support. That would go 
beyond requiring farms to minimise pollution and damaging externalities of all types, and 
to generally practice cross-compliance.. 
 
Rather than strive to achieve conservational gain on intensive commercial farms, 
it would seem more sensible to set out to achieve biodiversity and conservation gain on 
the lifestyle and residential holdings which are taking over ownership of an increasing 
share of agricultural land in Europe and the USA. Already in the USA it is possible to 
interpret Figure 20 in McElroy et al. (2002) as indicating that a disproportionately large 
share of Conservation Reserve Payments go to retirement and residential lifestyle farms, 
whereas production related subsidies dominantly go to intermediate and commercial 
family farms. That division in policy direction seems entirely logical, and recognises that 
the agricultural sector is not homogeneous, but is recognisably sub-divisible into 
commercial and lifestyle sectors. As price support policies are whittled away and replaced 
by direct payments in the process of reform, the scope for targeting support and tying it to 
the production of positive externalities of all types increases, and the options for 
achieving conservational and environmental gain according to type of ownership 
increases. 
  
Future EU agricultural policy reforms may have only small impacts on EU15 agricultural 
supply, with the exception of the still-to-be-reformed sugar regime and some minor 
products. Price support policy has and will be trimmed back, and in any case (it is argued 
here) responsiveness to price intervention policies is small and declining. To the extent 
that the single direct farm payment is decoupled, future reductions in it to meet budgetary 
disciplines should have only small impacts on supply and trade. That should enable the 
EU to be creative in pursuing an environmentally focussed agricultural land use policy, 
buttressed by regulations to control pollution by the intensive end of the farming 
structure.  




1 David Colman is Professor of Agricultural Economics in the School of Economic Studies; University of 
Manchester; U.K.  He can be contacted at david.colman@man.ac.uk 
2 Of course there is going to be substantial change in the newly joined EU14 countries. 
3 That is certainly the view of Colman and Harvey (2004b). 
3 Source Defra: e-Digest of Environmental Statistics, October 2003. 
4 The land price series is the MAFF/Defra series derived from Inland Revenue returns for tax purposes. 
These are deflated by the Retail Price Index for June of each year, taken from the Office of National 
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